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Abstract: The right to vote at the general is one of the 
most important rights that belongs to shareholders. This 
right empowers shareholders to subject the board of 
directors to account for their stewardship and where the 
board is found wanting, the shareholders may exercise 
their voting right to remove and replace the board. In 
Nigeria, the CAMA 1990 recognised the right of 
shareholder to vote at the general meeting. However, 
very few literatures could be found in this area. This 
study seeks to examine shareholder voting right from 
both philosophical and legal perspective in order to lay a 
solid foundation for shareholder voting right in Nigeria. 
The study will emphasise on the theory of shareholder 
voting and its relevance to corporate governance by 
unveiling the objective of shareholder vote as well as the 
relevant theory to shareholder vote. The study employed 
doctrinal legal research methodology in obtaining the 
relevant data. The findings show that this study is one of 
the very few studies that tries to identify theories that are 
relevant to shareholder vote in Nigeria. The study 
maintains that there are various theories that will support 
the exercise of shareholder voting in Nigeria including 
the option theory, agency theory, transaction cost theory, 
contract theory among others. In the same vein, 
regulators in Nigeria also need to double their effort and 
ensure that shareholder voting right is duly exercised. 
Additionally, considering the significance attached to 
shareholder vote, this study suggest that the CAMA 1990 
should make provisions that will ensure shareholder vote 
is duly exercise since there is both philosophical and 
legal basis for the exercise of shareholder vote. 
Keywords: Board of Directors, Shareholder, 
Voting Right, General Meeting  
Introduction 
The CAMA 1990 under section 63 distributes 
corporate powers between the board of directors 
and shareholders at the general meeting. However, 
the board is comprised of both executive and non-
executive directors, many of whom have other full-
time employment, and therefore spend little time 
about issues affecting the company (Paul and 
Randall, 2014). The directors sometimes hardly 
employ the control rights that legislation provides 
them and therefore mostly delegate their 
responsibility to other officers of the company to 
exercise it on their behalf. Often in pressing time 
will the board exercise their ultimate power to 
approve, or override, corporate managers’ key 
decisions about the prospect of the company (Paul 
& Randall, 2014). Shareholders, therefore, need to 
check the activities of the board which is exercise 
through their votes at the general meeting (Stewart 
& Randall, 1998). 
On the other hand, there is inconsistency regarding 
what an articulate theory would suggest and what is 
real. While it is often appealing to take a view on 
this, this study will not automatically assume that 
the current arrangements are the most efficient. 
However, this study will at times argue that long-
standing corporate arrangements be given the 
benefit of the doubt. To provide a full discussion 
regarding the philosophy underpinning shareholder 
voting, there is the need to at least first appreciate 
“Why are shareholders empowered to vote in a 
company?” Understanding the above question will 
certainly give room for good understanding of the 
philosophy and legal recognition of shareholder 
voting right. 
In most of the public companies, shareholders are 
empowered to vote on number of issues given to 
them by the company’s  legislation. In this regard, 
section 81 of the CAMA 1990 provides: “Every 
member shall notwithstanding any provision in the 
articles, have a right to attend any general meeting 
of the company and to speak and vote on any 
resolution before the meeting.” Furthermore, the 
CAMA 1990 provides: “Notwithstanding anything 
to the contrary in the terms or the articles, include 
the right to attend any general meeting of the 
company and vote at such a meeting,” (section 
114(b) CAMA 1990). At the meeting, shareholders 
can elect the members of the board of directors 
(section 247, 248, 249 CAMA 1999) approve 
proposed amendments to the company’s article 
(section 47, 48 CAMA 1990) and remove directors 
(section 262 CAMA 1999) if the need arises. 
Additionally, shareholder vote equally empowers 
shareholder to approve annual report and accounts 
presented by the board (Stewart J. S. & Randall, 
S.T., 1998) among other powers. However, there is 
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need to examine this right from the philosophical 
perspective which little has been done in Nigeria.  
Materials and Methods 
This study mainly adopts doctrinal legal research 
methodology which is generally carried out in the 
library (Yaqin, 2007; Watkins & Burton, 2013). 
The materials in this study were obtained mainly 
from the library database and other archives of the 
Universiti Utara Malaysia and Bauchi State 
University, Gadau. These materials were mostly 
statutory provisions and decided cases that are 
relevant to the study. In addition, scholarly articles 
from the USA and other jurisdictions were equally 
referred to in this study.  This is based on the fact 
that the relevant theories in this study largely 
originates from the USA. 
Results and Discussion 
The Philosophical basis for Shareholder Vote 
This sub-heading begins with the question, “Why 
are shareholders empowered to vote?” There are 
various justifications given over time. One of the 
earliest justifications given for the shareholder 
voting right was proposed by Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1991), where they argued that shareholders 
play the role of “gap fillers” in a company. Reason 
being, the shareholders hold the residual interest in 
the company. They have “the appropriate 
incentives … to make discretionary decisions…The 
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains 
and incur most of the marginal costs. They 
therefore have the right incentives to exercise the 
discretion” (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991, at 68) 
through voting at general meeting. In other word, 
the right to exercise discretion through the right to 
vote, follows from the shareholder’s claim on the 
residual value of the company. That right might be 
delegated to the board of directors or managers of 
the company, for obvious reasons, but the board of 
directors may exercise authority subject to the 
agreement of the shareholders (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1991).  
The conception of the shareholder voting as 
following from their claim on what is left (the 
residual value) of the company has been criticised 
for various reasons. From the theoretical 
perspective, the Options Theory argued that debt 
holders are also residual claimants, although in 
practice, we only see debt holders  voting when the 
company is in distress  (Stout, 2002). Furthermore, 
as a practical matter, one can argue that many other 
stakeholders of the company also have some claim 
on the residual value (Blair, 1995; Stout, 2012). 
Additional complicating matters is that the 
shareholder’s  legal “claim” to the residual value of 
the company is at best conditional. Generally, 
shareholders cannot force the board to issue 
dividends. Shareholders can only be certain that 
they can tap into the residual value of the firm to 
the extent that the stock market values any 
advances that are made, leading to potential capital 
gains for them if they sell their shares (Stout, 
2012). This is one of the rationale behind 
empowering shareholders with a voting right.  
Under the Option Theory, the shareholders have 
the right to make all “gap-filling” decisions for the 
company. In any way, it is the directors that are 
shouldered with the governance role in the 
company. It is argued that it is exactly the above 
governance control of the company by the board 
that is the primary benefit of the corporate form 
(Bainbridge 2006). Undeniably, Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s theory is consistent with any observable 
behavior of the shareholders, either in support of 
their voting or their decision to delegate any (or all) 
decisions to the board.  
Another argument for shareholder voting relates to 
Berle and Means’ observation of the separation of 
ownership and control of the modern companies 
(Berle and Means, 1932). The above argument was 
expatiated further by Jensen and Meckling, where 
they argued that the exchange of equity for capital 
creates a “principal-agent relationship” between the 
shareholders and the board of directors  (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). There is temptation for the agent 
(the board of directors) to benefits from this 
relationship. The principal (shareholders) can 
minimise these costs by adjusting the cost of 
capital and engaging in some level of monitoring 
and checkmating the activities of the board of 
directors (Rashida and Mohammad, 2010). This is 
possible through shareholder voting as  one 
mechanism by which monitoring is implemented, 
and the level of monitoring depends on the benefit 
the shareholders would gain (Baums, 2000). 
However, the principal-agent popularly the Agency 
Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as the 
theoretical basis for shareholder voting will now be 
examined in respect of argument for and against. It 
is argued that the agency relationship between 
shareholders and directors does not meet the legal 
requirements of principal-agent relationship. The 
agency relationship “arises when  one person, 
(principal) manifests assent to another person 
(agent) that the agent shall act on the principal’s 
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and 
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so 
to act” (Restatement of the Law of Agency (Third), 
2006, 1.01). It is argued that directors claim 
independence for all business decisions, it is 
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difficult to see how the directors assented to 
shareholders’ control as required in an agency 
relationship. However, making inference from the 
provision of section 33 & 63 of the CAMA 1990 
leaves no one in doubt that the board act on behalf 
of the shareholders since the article creates a 
contract between the shareholders and the directors.  
On the one hand, the exercise of voting right at the 
general meeting is one way to check the board of 
director’s excesses which equally implies that the 
shareholders are the principal. According to (Blair, 
1995; Stout, 2012) there is evidence that the law 
requires the boards to “act on the shareholder’s 
behalf,” no matter how it is. Jensen and Meckling 
describe an agency relationship “as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent” 
(Jensen & Mackling, 1976). To determine the 
agency relationship between shareholders and the 
board will depend on the nature of the transaction 
between the shareholders and the board of directors 
which is mainly regulated by the article of 
association (section 33 of the CAMA 1990). This 
provision indicates that a contractual relationship 
exists between the shareholders and the board of 
directors. The Court of Appeal of Nigeria re-
affirmed that the article is a binding contract 
between the shareholders and the board which can 
only be amended by altering the article (section 47, 
48 CAMA 1990; Longe v. FBN PLC, [2006] 
LPELR 7682) 
According to Williamson’s Transaction Cost 
Economics Model, shareholder vote is one way that 
the company lowers the cost of capital by 
providing some assurance to the shareholders that 
their investment will not be misappropriated 
(Williamson, 1989). However, if you consider the 
public offering by Google, the shares were non-
voting shares but were still subscribed. 
Shareholders agreed to take shares in the company 
even though without voting right attached to the 
shares and no assurance of return. This is because, 
they had confidence that they would realize 
sufficient return even without controlling the 
directors through the exercise of voting. This is 
obviously not in line with the provision of the 
CAMA 1990 which prohibits the issuance of non-
voting shares (section 116(1)(b) CAMA 1990). The 
section provides: “Where, at the commencement of 
this Act, any share of a company carries more than 
one vote or does not carry any vote at a general 
meeting of the company, such a share shall be 
deemed, as from the appointed day, to carry one 
vote only” (section 116(1)(b) CAMA, 1990). The 
above provision indicates that under no 
circumstance a company shall issue non-voting 
shares. This aims to sanction the right of 
shareholders to vote at general meeting. The 
confidence that shareholders have of getting return 
on investment without checkmating the board of 
directors through the exercise of voting right could 
be reasoned speculation and not justified. For 
example, shareholders might believe that Google, 
by paying their employees in stock have effectively 
secure a means to monitor the board (Paul & 
Randall, 2014). However, this has no place under 
the CAMA 1990 as mentioned (section 116(1)(b) 
CAMA 1990).  
The Contractarian viewed shareholder vote as part 
of the contract between the shareholders and the 
company. The Court of Appeal of Nigeria (Longe 
v. FBN PLC, [2006] LPELR 7682) held that, the 
powers vested on the board of directors was a 
contractual one and can only be removed by 
amendment to the article. The memorandum and 
article signifies a binding contract between the 
company and its shareholders. However, if 
shareholders choose to invest in a company without 
voting rights and weak monitoring mechanisms, it 
is either the shareholders purchased the shares at a 
low price and so they have little fear that the board 
will avoid its responsibilities , or some combination 
of the two (Paul & Randall, 2014). However, the 
only option that is legally available under the 
CAMA 1990 is for the shareholders to choose 
among the various classes of shares. It provides: 
“Without prejudice to any special rights previously 
conferred on the holders of any existing shares or 
class of shares, any share in a company may be 
issued with such preferred, deferred or other 
special rights or such restrictions, whether with 
regard to dividend, return of capital or otherwise, 
as the company may, from time to time, determine 
by ordinary resolution” (section 119 CAMA 1990). 
In anyway, such shares shall not be without voting 
right. 
Another issue relevant to the “principal-agent” 
relationship is the claim that shareholders “own” 
the company and that their right to vote follows 
from this ownership (Weide, 1996). Hansmann 
(1988) believed that “the shareholder franchise is 
the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests” (Blasius, 
1988). Some scholars rested their support of the 
shareholder franchise based on the model of 
shareholder democracy (Harris, 2011). On the one 
hand, (Lipton and Savitt 2007; Stout, 2007), argued 
that looking at a company from the perspective of 
options theory make any claim about “ownership” 
almost nonsensical (Partnoy, 2000). Shareholders 
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are unique in their relationship to the company. 
They are the sole stakeholders whose returns on 
investment is linked directly to the changes in the 
stock price of the company. That is the only way 
that shareholders can be sure of getting any 
positive return on their investment is by selling the 
shares at market price to realize a capital gain (or 
loss). They are not generally guaranteed any 
dividend or any other payment from the company. 
All the other including stakeholders, employees, 
debtors, suppliers knows their returns is attached to 
the risk the company may incur (Paul & Randall, 
2014). Although this is somehow complicated 
when a director is to be compensated with stock. 
Such arrangements are usually a deliberate effort to 
create “pay for performance.” In other words, since 
management is insufficiently attentive to 
shareholder interests, the compensation package 
should put them in the shoes of shareholders in 
order to protect the interest of shareholders. There 
is still argument as to compensating a director with 
shares can result in protecting the interest of 
shareholders (Core, Guay and Thomas (2005).  
For most of the public companies, the stock 
markets are given sufficient information about the 
company’s value so that it is accurately reflected in 
their share price. As a result, shareholders are the 
only corporate stakeholders whose return is 
dependent on both the residual value and the 
accurate functioning of the stock market (Joseph, 
2009). Therefore, it is in the best interest of the 
shareholders to ensure that the residual value of the 
company is maximized. This is possible when 
directors know that shareholders have the right to 
remove them through exercising their voting right 
at the general meeting (section 263 CAMA 1990). 
The Role of Regulators on Shareholder Vote 
Regulators are expected to play a significant role in 
protecting the voting right of shareholders. In 
Nigeria, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) 
established by section 7 of the CAMA 1990, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) which were 
established principally by the Investment and 
Securities Act, 2007 (ISA 2007) perform the 
regulatory oversight of companies in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Rules 
and Regulations, 2013 as well as the Rules and 
Regulations of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 2015 
also compliment the main legislation in sanction 
the voting right of shareholders.  
Shareholders can use the monitoring function of the 
vote to help accomplish their aims and where the 
board is not complying with request of the 
shareholders, the board is subject to removal by 
shareholder vote through passing of resolution 
election at the general meeting (section 263 CAMA 
1990; Mallin and Andrea, 2012). The requirement 
that shareholders approve mergers and sales of 
assets puts pressure on the board to realize the full 
value of the stock. Thus, shareholder vote is very 
beneficial in providing the shareholders with the 
ability to monitor the board so that their interest is 
protected. It is still arguable whether the current 
law governing the shareholder vote are adequate to 
empower shareholders to effectively monitor the 
act of the board (Bebchuk, 2006, 2007; Bainbridge, 
2006; Strine, 2006; Lipton and Savitt, 2007; Stout, 
2007; Mallin and Andrea, 2012).  
Other Options Available to Shareholders 
Shareholder vote may be one of the best way to 
protect their interests. This study will now examine 
why other options available to shareholders are not 
effective. As an alternative to shareholder voting, 
shareholders can always sell their stock or may sue 
the company’s  officers and directors in a court. But 
then, why are these two options still ineffective? 
Starting with the sale of shares by shareholders, if a 
shareholder is not satisfied with the way the 
directors are running of the company, he can 
inform the board and dispose of his shares. 
However, the concern that the shareholder has is 
the share price, and so the shareholder will be 
asked to accept a lower price than the value of his 
shares. To force the shareholder to give up return 
as the only means to monitor the board is certainly 
not an attractive option. In this regard, a 
shareholder would barely realize a fair valuation of 
his shares (Air Products, 2011). The selling shares 
may only be an effective monitoring device if the 
board of directors is also largely compensated by 
stock (Paul & Randall, 2014). This may have the 
potential to give shareholders much influence over 
the performance of the board of directors.  
Regarding shareholder’s option to sue in court. For 
general matters of corporate business, instituting 
action in court has very large transaction costs in 
terms of expenses. Moreover, there are serious 
questions of institutional competence when it 
comes to courts making decisions about corporate 
policy, which have led courts to develop the 
business judgment rule to dismiss shareholder 
litigation. Under the CAMA 1990 for example, the 
options of selling the shares and or suing the board 
of directors are not a good option, anyway.  
Although section 300 of the CAMA 1990 has 
stipulates certain situations that warrant a 
shareholder to institute an action against the 
company, it has continued to be a difficult issue in 
Nigeria. The principle of majority rule laid down in 
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(Foss v. Harbottle [1843) 2 Hare 461) has continue 
to hinder successful filing of cases by individual 
shareholders in Nigeria. Moreover, filing of cases 
in court takes too long from filing to 
judgement/order of court (Halima, 2016). 
Furthermore, since successful representative 
shareholder law suits are not getting higher, this 
may well increase the importance of corporate 
voting as a monitoring mechanism (Cox and 
Thomas 2009; Boilermakers Local, 2013). This 
leaves voting right as generally the most desirable 
form of giving voice to shareholders. Voting can be 
very useful in monitoring and conveying 
information to the board. In some circumstances, it 
allows shareholders to collect information and thus 
acts to correct board errors.  
Thus, the justification for shareholder voting, then, 
is not based on the assumption that the 
shareholders hold the claim on the residual value of 
the firm. It is on the fact that the certainty of return 
to the shareholder is linked to improvements of the 
share price. The study maintained that the 
shareholder, whose return is influenced by the act 
of the board of directors should be able to give to 
effectively have a voice through their votes . This is 
likely the best reason to give shareholders a vote.  
Conclusion 
In this study, various theories supporting the 
exercise of shareholder vote were examined.  Thus, 
shareholder voting as provided under the CAMA 
1990 as well other rules and regulations on 
company meetings have theoretical basis 
underpinning same. In other word, shareholder vote 
is justified by its uniqueness in monitoring the 
activities of the board of directors and in 
maximizing the share price of the company as it 
creates their only non-discretionary return on their 
investment (Bebchuk, 2005).  Furthermore, this 
study argued that, shareholder voting is justified in 
two other ways. Firstly, shareholders can act as 
cost-effective monitors of the activities of the board 
of directors. Secondly, shareholder vote will enable 
shareholders to get confidential information that 
will assist the board in reaching the informed 
decision. In conclusion, the right of shareholder to 
vote appears to be the best form of monitoring the 
activities of the board of directors as the two other 
alternatives of selling stock or filing action against 
the company were all not effective. In view of that, 
the CAMA 1990 should emphasise that the 
shareholder voting right must be respected and 
exercised accordingly. Finally, the various theories 
namely; option theory, agency theory, transaction 
cost and contract theory all appears to have some 
relevance or supporting the exercise the of 
shareholder vote as encapsulated under the CAMA 
1990. 
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